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I began writing this reply on New Year’s Day. At least in our better 
moments, we use that day to reflect on the past year’s reasons for 
gratitude and to make new commitments for the year ahead. That was 
fitting. As a reason for gratitude, I am in the unusual position of 
getting elaborate, written feedback on a book from two commenters 
who are leaders in their fields,1 even though the project is only 
complete in the sense that a first-draft manuscript exists. That sort of 
thing seems hard to come by, especially for an unknown author 
writing a first monograph. Both did that, by the way, even though they 
are essentially strangers to me and even though there is nothing really 
in it for them, after reading a very long manuscript that I delivered to 
them catastrophically late. Moreover, Professor Peter Shane, this 
journal’s advisor, not only made the opportunity available, but took a 
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big chance on a book that still required a huge amount of writing on a 
tight schedule. He also put up with a lot of delays and blown 
deadlines. For those reasons, it would feel wrong to write this reply in 
the usual manner of armed combat. Instead I’ve just tried to explain 
how I’ll use the valuable gift these three have handed me to make the 
book better. 
Anyway, as for new commitments, the coming year just happens to 
be roughly the period I think it will take to finish this essentially half-
done book. I already had a lot of resolutions for its final year, but they 
now include fixing a new problem that seems serious: Certain things 
plainly require clarification to avoid misunderstanding. In fact, I think 
this little discussion was among three people who mostly agree with 
each other, except that the reviewers may not have known it because I 
failed to explain myself well enough. Because I didn’t, they mostly 
didn’t discuss what I always intended to be the book’s real 
contribution and its most interesting material. 
Early in writing the book, my excellent and far-seeing editor 
pointed something out to me that is probably obvious, but that still 
strikes me as foundational: there are problem-books and there are 
solution-books. From the beginning I saw this as a problem-book, in 
which solutions would play supporting roles at best. As I tried to make 
clear in the book, but will now try do even more clearly, the reason 
Apple seemed remarkable enough to write a book about was not its 
facts or circumstances or the legal issues it raised. It was the fact that 
popular reaction to it was so different than the antitrust-professional’s 
reaction. That in turn seemed to pose a very interesting theoretical 
opportunity. Attacking it—working out that big-picture social 
phenomenon in theoretical terms—is the problem at the heart of this 
problem-book. In any case, while it is probably in some respect just 
because policy prescriptions are what law professors do, both 
reviewers apparently took it as a solution-book, especially Professor 
Wickelgren. He gives mainly just a long critique of rules of per se 
illegality in reply to a book that makes few if any real policy proposals 
at all, much less recommendations for more per se rules.  
That being the case, I will start out in Part I by trying to restate 
what I see as the problem that is the book’s only immediate concern. 
That restatement will be a first draft for how I will try to clarify it in 
the book. Part II will then react to the two critiques individually. They 
happen to be full of useful points from which this book will benefit, 
even beyond the clarification of its purpose. Even their specific 
doctrinal points are apposite in that I do happen to set out some 
thoughts of a doctrinal nature. (I do that for the practical reason that 
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if I didn’t, then this pretty down-beat book could be misunderstood as 
me arguing that antitrust is hopeless or bad.) Part III briefly concludes 
by saying what I think really was at the heart of these two reviews, 
though they may seem quite different. 
I. WHAT I REALLY MEANT 
The big-picture theoretical problem that I envision was inspired by 
something Thurman Arnold once said. (This is in the book, but at 
present it appears way at the end, and it bears repeating here.) A bit 
chillingly, he said it after having served as the nation’s most 
celebrated, tireless, and influential antitrust chief. On an academic 
panel in the late 1940s, at which legal and economic scholars debated 
whether antitrust had done any good, he said this: 
 
The antitrust laws have not been effective in the real 
world . . . . Unfortunately, all antitrust law enforcement 
under any plan depends on the public attitude.2 
 
With that in mind, it dawned on me when first thinking about 
Apple that the public view of antitrust had been poor toward antitrust 
not just in that case, but in all kinds of cases, for a long time. That in 
turn seemed important in understanding the larger political problem 
of having a competition policy at all. It seemed promising to try to 
figure out if any common themes unite the different cases that have 
lacked popular support, however different they might otherwise seem. 
And indeed, to me something did seem common among them.  
The common theme is this: the very competition itself that is 
supposed to be our preferred state of affairs is price competition. 
Theoretical details vary and people fight over them, but basically, 
price competition means comparatively numerous, autonomous units 
vying non-cooperatively for the same customers, on the basis of 
quality-adjusted price. As a practical matter our antitrust laws imply 
that it is our default position, and that departures from it require 
antitrust analysis. But it is in many respects disagreeable to its 
participants and bystanders, even though it may generate the best 
overall outcomes on an aggregate basis. Their incentives therefore are 
to seek government or private protection from it, and to rationalize 
 
 
 
 
2 Thurman Arnold, Symposium, The Effectiveness of the Federal Antitrust Laws, 39 AM. 
ECON. REV. 690, 690 (1949). 
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the protection as not just service of their own pecuniary interest. They 
argue in many ways that protection is needed to preserve important 
social values. And though their rationalizations will seem varied and 
idiosyncratic—and though they may believe in them very sincerely—it 
seemed to me that very often they could be understood as boiling 
down to one, comparatively simple argument. The common thread 
seemed to be that the pressure on firms to reduce their costs would in 
some cases prevent them from doing things that would be otherwise 
desirable. Apple is such a case, obviously enough. Some critics, for 
example, said that publishers need protection from price competition 
because if they are forced to cut costs in marketplace combat, they 
won’t subsidize high literature. Others said that very low retail prices 
would reduce author royalties so much that they wouldn’t write books 
anymore. Other critics yet said that if Amazon could compete fiercely 
on price, competing entrants would be unable to enter, because for 
some reason or other no one else could devise the relevant technology 
and negotiate the contracts. In other words, in each case the argument 
was that if Amazon could set price where it wanted, exploiting 
whatever advantages it had been able to come by, then markets would 
be unable to do the most basic thing they are predicted by theory to 
do. They would be unable to evolve institutional means to deliver the 
things that are desired at the most desirable quality-adjusted price. I 
then spend most of the book explaining that the same inner core 
unifies all kinds of arguments people have made throughout the 
history of competition law in all kinds of other cases. That is why I say 
in the book that the many, highly varied arguments for special 
treatment that have characterized the policy are in fact just disguised 
opposition to competition itself. That claim may or may not prove as 
true as I think it is, but it seems like an interesting and worthwhile 
thing to explore, and it is wholly unrelated to the state of antitrust 
doctrine. 
I am aware that the argument will strike some as lumping together 
theoretically distinct arguments that each deserve evaluation on their 
own terms. Quite often the suspicion of price competition will be 
formulated in externality terms, as with the fear of lost literary values 
in publishing or the free-riding defense of resale price maintenance 
(RPM). Other times it will manifest more like a classic destructive 
competition argument, in claiming that some inherent flaw in a 
market will keep firms from covering their basic costs of production. It 
could probably take other, superficially distinct forms. But it doesn’t 
really matter. The precise form in which the instinct manifests itself is 
not the point. My point instead was a political or sociological one. The 
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common theme in these cases is a popular susceptibility to skepticism 
of market outcomes, justified by more or less rigorous models in 
which price competition itself precludes the optimal satisfaction of 
some value. So, the problem is not precisely why people believe that a 
market doesn’t work in a given case, but their proneness to believe it 
because they doubt that decentralized price rivalry can really 
accomplish so much. Most specifically, what seems unifying in all the 
theories I discuss is that they attempt to explain injuries or 
dissatisfactions that really are just ordinary incidents of healthy 
competition. In short, what unites the cases is a propensity to mistake 
the ordinary losses characteristic of competition for idiosyncratic, 
case-specific market defects.  
I likened those models to the traditional destructive competition 
reasoning of the turn of the 20th century in part for a possibly 
unwholesome or manipulative reason. It links them with disfavored 
theories, and I think the newer ones should be disfavored too. But I 
also think it serves a legitimate purpose to show that this same 
process has come and gone more frequently than we think. First, real 
or perceived loss or change occurs. Margins are too thin, and 
businesses may fail. Jobs and investments might be lost or well-loved 
products or ways of doing business disappear. Affected parties and 
observers model the problem as an exception to the normal order, 
arguing that low prices themselves, in the particular circumstances, 
rob the market’s ability to provide something that society needs. The 
thing might be a product, an informational or marketing service, a 
kind of retail organization, innovation, entrepreneurial opportunity, 
the entry of new firms, a broad or “non-economic” social value, or 
whatever. As it happens, I believe the history discloses another 
common step in the process. After some sort of protection is deployed 
for a while, to correct the perceived market failing, different evidence 
emerges showing that in fact markets would have been able to figure 
out solutions and that the protections just posed problems of their 
own, if indeed they did any good at all.  
This is a crude kind of reasoning on my part, even if one agrees 
with my portrayal of the many arguments over time and their failures. 
It does not logically follow that because something happened a certain 
way before that it will again. But it seems useful to confront the 
popular propensity to fear price competition by showing that it has 
happened before, and that the fears have mostly not been borne out.  
Importantly, in any case, while I explain at some length why I 
think price rivalry can be trusted quite a lot, it is not ultimately 
necessary for my basic theoretical claim to prove that all those 
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critiques of price competition were wrong. My claim is that whether 
they are right or wrong, the public is prone to believe in them, and 
that if it looks for it the public can find similar evidence of harm from 
price competition in most situations. That in itself is a fairly 
significant result for competition policy, and how well it can be 
expected to work. But more poignantly, if in fact the public is right 
about how often price competition fails, that is then a very serious 
policy problem. On the one hand, I don’t happen to agree with 
Professor Wickelgren that antitrust must or should bother with 
“robust rule of reason” in all or most cases to accommodate local 
failures of price rivalry (as to which see Part II.A to follow). But if it is 
in fact true that problems serious enough to require the in-depth 
inquiry that he seems to favor in nearly all antitrust litigation, then it 
will work poorly at best and will be expensive and little used. If 
antitrust must work in that way, then I think it is probably not worth 
the trouble.  
II. TWO RESPONSES, THAT ARE MORE INTERRELATED THAN THEY MAY 
SEEM 
A. The Case for Simplicity: I’ll Have the Bacon (Method), Please 
I will confess that of the two essays, Professor Wickelgren’s was 
rather more frustrating, but only for the same reason that I think he 
probably found my book frustrating as well. Though I think he and I 
are largely on the same ideological side, for whatever that may be 
worth, the difference between us is a very familiar one in antitrust and 
it has sometimes gotten pretty hot. On the brighter side, dealing with 
the things that frustrate us is usually all the more productive for us 
personally. 
Strictly speaking, Professor Wickelgren makes at least two 
separate points, one of which I think is extremely good and I’ll address 
separately below,3 and the other of which I’ll hit first. The one I 
address first was less persuasive to me, but then again, it’s the one 
that has been the focus of so much disagreement in antitrust. It is 
obviously a matter about which people can differ. 
 
(1) The Reason for Simplicity: It Is a Mistake to Confuse Law and 
Social Science. With my apologies, because Professor Wickelgren 
 
 
 
 
3 See infra Part II.A.2. 
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might characterize it differently or find my characterization 
problematic, I see the difference between us as judging how much of 
the cost of uncertainty in antitrust should be on defendants, and how 
much on plaintiffs. His paper implies that it should be pretty heavily 
on the plaintiffs, and that this is so because of a basic problem of 
human epistemology. In this, his essay follows an assumption that has 
dominated antitrust for at least forty years, and that has gone 
essentially unquestioned even though it begs questions of 
foundational significance. The assumption is that there is no 
difference between social science and law. But indeed they differ a 
great deal. To borrow famous words from Derek Bok, who, like 
Professor Wickelgren, had formal training both as a lawyer and as an 
economist:  
 
Lawyers have perhaps not always been explicit enough 
in articulating the peculiar qualifications which their 
institutions place upon the unbridled pursuit of truth, 
[to the] irritation . . . [of] even thoughtful 
economists. . . . [But] [u]nless we can be certain of the 
capacity of our legal system to absorb new doctrine, our 
attempts to introduce it will only be more ludicrous in 
failure and more costly in execution.4 
 
In abstract principle, we have framed the question in every 
individual antitrust case to be the same: whether the challenged 
conduct has a net-positive social impact. Because we now think the 
“social impact” should be measured by “efficiency” as defined in 
economic theory, that means in principle that the question is whether 
the conduct causes a net-positive or net-negative change in surplus, 
measured in dollars.5 On some abstract level, that change itself could 
be rigorously quantified and precisely measured. Obviously, though, 
actually measuring it is problematic for various reasons, among them 
that it is laborious, expensive, and inevitably controverted. So as a 
matter of policy we have spared plaintiffs the cost of it in cases where 
 
 
 
 
4 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 226, 228 (1960). 
5 With the usually minor qualification that, technically, it is not total welfare that counts, 
but consumer surplus. See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original 
and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982) (originating this now widely accepted argument). 
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we think the risk of mistakenly condemning conduct is low enough 
that a full demonstration just to make sure would seem unjustified. 
We have often taken it as an important policy problem to decide which 
cases should fall within categories exempted from full empirical 
demonstration. That debate takes place both in academic journals and 
in the decisions of federal judges. In the nature of things, it mostly 
consists of theoretical arguments about whether particular categories 
of conduct can be said to be reliably, categorically net-harmful. If so, 
then in various ways we give plaintiffs some relief from full factual 
demonstration of actual economic effects. Empirical evidence figures 
as well, but typically the empirical evidence is scarce, and even where 
it is plentiful the questions usually remain inconclusive or 
controversial. 
The making of this choice is Professor Wickelgren’s only theme. 
“Antitrust is complicated,” he says in an introductory passage, and he 
argues that trial procedures must accordingly be used to ventilate all 
that complexity fully.6 He so argues mainly because of what I will 
describe as an epistemological problem. In making policy, it is hard 
for us to think about the task except by categorizing kinds of conduct 
and deciding how the different categories should be treated by law. 
But the problem with categories is saying which things should be 
included in them and which things excluded. No matter how carefully 
we define a category, specific examples will occur that pose 
unanticipated doubts whether they should be treated the same as 
other instances in the category. We can never, in antitrust or 
elsewhere, make legal rules with objective certainty, and it will always 
be possible in principle to argue that some applications of a rule are 
undesirable. 
Professor Wickelgren argues that where there is uncertainty 
whether particular cases should be in a prohibited category, we must 
err on the side of caution. An issue in responding to his view is 
knowing when he thinks there is sufficient “uncertainty.” In fairness, 
he does not say that every possible uncertainty should trigger full-
blown balancing, but his explanation for how we make that call 
seems—again with my apologies—capricious and uninformative. All 
he really says is that some kind of “robust” review must happen 
whenever arguments exist creating a “plausible” or “credible” 
possibility that a category of conduct is even sometimes not harmful. 
He doesn’t say how that judgment is made or who makes it, but the 
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essay makes it seem like a very low standard. At one point he says that 
“[t]he current literature”—which is to say, the mostly a priori, 
theoretical literature in economics and law speculating that particular 
kinds of conduct might be harmful or beneficial—“makes clear that 
any other approach” would be unacceptable.7 With respect, I’m not 
sure how the current literature makes anything “clear” to anyone. The 
only thing that is clear from reading it is that questions left to a priori 
speculation will always, irremediably remain unclear. 
And so, if “uncertainty” depends on the presence of not plainly 
false theoretical arguments in the literature demonstrating the 
possibility of pro-competitive explanations, then I think defense 
experts should be able to make the case for full-blown factual 
consideration in just about any case except the narrow range of cases 
now treated as a matter of law under per se or “quick look” standards. 
Indeed I’m not really sure why Professor Wickelgren says that Apple 
was so plainly a case for per se treatment. Even I don’t doubt that 
reasonable people could consider Apple complex, with “plausible” or 
“credible” reasons to suspect that the conspiracy could generate 
benefits, and I wrote a whole book saying it should be illegal. After all, 
in the Apple case, Apple had the assistance of an expert witness 
named Benjamin Klein, who is not only a preeminent economist, but a 
main progenitor in the RPM literature that Professor Wickelgren 
considers plausible and credible. In Apple, Klein provided arguments 
implying that Apple’s conduct should not be automatically illegal. 
Unless he was in this particular case a transparently obvious liar, it’s 
hard to see why we can just rule his arguments more obviously out of 
order than in the RPM context. In fact, on Professor Wickelgren’s 
plausibility standard, defense experts should be able routinely to 
mislead courts into treating horizontal cartels and naked hub-and-
spoke deals with full-blown fact consideration, because in fact there 
are very, very frequently arguments of abstract speculation available, 
that are at least conceivably correct, that those things might do some 
good. 
In any case, to handle this complexity, Professor Wickelgren says 
that “a robust rule of reason” is the only acceptable procedure for 
antitrust cases wherever there is his specified measure of uncertainty. 
He never quite says what it consists of, and as I’ll explain, he may not 
mean quite what he seems to. As it happens, a common problem when 
people talk about the rule-of-reason is that they may be talking about 
 
 
 
 
7 Id. at 356 (emphasis added).  
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different things without knowing it. So, it may be that he and I do not 
differ so much as either of us think. But it sounds like he favors 
something I consider radical and very undesirable. The essay reads as 
though he wants courts in most cases not only to apply the multi-step 
burden-shifting procedure that now constitutes the full, 
unabbreviated rule of reason.8 He wants them always or commonly to 
give defendants so much benefit of the doubt that there would be a 
case-by-case “balancing” of the quantified costs and benefits of 
challenged conduct. That is, he seems to be arguing not only about the 
choice between per se and rule of reason treatment, but about how the 
rule of reason should be applied. In most cases, a court would receive 
evidence from at least one economist for each side on not only the 
plaintiff’s prima facie showing of anticompetitive effect—which 
typically consists of a plausible theory of harm and proof of sizable 
market share—and not only on whatever pro-competitive upsides the 
defendant might allege, but also on the ultimate quantitative question 
whether plaintiff’s proof of actual harm outweighs whatever benefits 
there might be.9 
If this is really Professor Wickelgren’s vision for antitrust, then I’m 
afraid I can’t agree at all. First, he seems unconcerned with—and 
never mentions, really—the widely shared abhorrence for case-by-case 
judicial “balancing” in antitrust.10 Actual balancing is disfavored by 
academics, lawyers, and judges across the political spectrum for an 
 
 
 
 
8 See, e.g., O'Bannon v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015); 
Cap. Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 
1993); Agnew v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 683 F.3d 328, 335 (7th Cir. 2012); PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, Vol. VII, ANTITRUST LAW 389-90 (3d ed. 2006). 
9 See Wickelgren, supra note 1. There remains some real confusion over what is supposed 
to happen at this very last step, since the caselaw implies that plaintiffs must also prove 
that the defendant’s purported benefits could be achieved by less harmful means. There is 
little law on how courts actually should handle this tail-end of the analysis, no doubt 
because reaching it is so rare, but in any case, there are seriously conflicting signals within 
the caselaw how it actually works. See Gabriel A. Feldman, The Misuse of the Less 
Restrictive Alternative Inquiry in Rule of Reason Analysis, 58 AM. U.L. REV. 561, 561 
(2009). It does not really matter much for what I say here. 
10 See, e.g., ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW 
IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 207 (2d ed. 
2008); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLES AND EXECUTION 30 
(2005); Peter C. Carstensen, The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago 
Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the “Rule of Reason” in Restraint of Trade 
Analysis, in 15 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 65-68 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Victor 
P. Goldberg eds., 1992). 
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important reason that he doesn’t acknowledge. The problem is 
definitely not just that it is difficult and costly. That is admittedly its 
own concern, and I humbly submit it is a big one. It probably pretty 
significantly impedes the bringing of actions by the contingency-fee 
class action lawyers who finance virtually all antitrust enforcement in 
America.11 Rather, it so happens to be just deeply unlikely to improve 
accuracy. Even under the best circumstances, the measurement 
involves complexity—really, philosophical challenges—beyond human 
capacity to manage objectively. In the end, even in best-case 
circumstances, we can only estimate the welfare consequences of any 
particular conduct, and different economists’ estimates will ordinarily 
differ substantially. 
To be sure, in a significant way, this emphasis on adjudication 
through fulsome social science analysis, rather than through 
categorical rules fashioned by courts over time, is really just a 
procedural distinction. But it is an important one, and it seems to me 
likely to make antitrust litigation less rather than more accurate. Its 
real effect is to put even more of antitrust decision-making into the 
hands of the individual expert-witness economists hired by the 
parties. Cases will still be decided by non-economist factfinders—
which could be a lay jury if either party exercises its right to one.12 The 
difference would be that in each case they would have freedom to 
decide not only the facts needed for application of a judge-made rule, 
but which of two opaquely complex expert positions better captures 
the actual state of the world. 
It is in part for these reasons that true net-benefits balancing, in 
which a fact-finder in merits litigation formally chooses among expert 
economists’ quantified estimates of welfare consequences, is very rare. 
 
 
 
 
11 With respect, Professor Wickelgren’s one point attempting to downplay this cost is 
wholly unpersuasive. He says that requiring plaintiffs to put on fuller rule-of-reason 
demonstrations will not matter, because, as did the Justice Department in the Apple case, 
they already routinely plead and prepare both per se and rule of reason allegations in the 
cases they bring. Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 360. But that is, candidly, ridiculous. They 
do that, but only because the only cases they bring, by and large, are cases they feel pretty 
sure will give them per se or quick look treatment. That they add rule of reason allegations 
is not because they like rule of reason cases or do not consider them costly. They add them 
as failsafes so that the cases they are hoping are per se cases—the only cases they really 
bring—will not get tossed if a judge decides per se treatment is not appropriate.  
12 See, In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069, 1079 (3d Cir. 1980). 
402 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 14:2 
 
 
In American law, it almost never happens.13 That could be so for 
various reasons, including that antitrust litigation itself is relatively 
rare and those antitrust suits that are filed rarely reach the final merits 
on any standard. But balancing is also thought to be rare just because 
courts avoid it when they can, through means for early dismissal or by 
resolving cases either on the prima facie showing or the defendant’s 
initial rebuttal. Even those who argue that this still involves a kind of 
balancing recognize that full net-benefits consideration is 
problematic, and favor the search for judge-made short-cuts.14 
But all that said, I have a bigger problem with this fulsome-fact-
inquiry agitation, and it goes to whether antitrust can exist as a 
meaningful policy or not. Professor Wickelgren does not state it in 
these terms and does not cite the relevant literature, but his argument 
follows more or less directly the reasoning of the so-called “decision 
theory” or “error cost” literature in antitrust. Decision-theory 
advocates observe that in social science we approach the adoption of 
conclusions skeptically and conservatively—we accept them only when 
there is strong reason to do so. They argue that in law, just the same, 
government should be reticent to act where there is uncertainty 
surrounding challenged conduct. They have been criticized for any 
number of specific incautious assumptions and elisions, including a 
surprisingly strong empirical assumption that entry is so generally, 
globally easy and effective in American markets that markets self-
correct better than antitrust can fix them. They made that claim with 
no meaningful evidentiary support then or now.15 
But the most important criticism of that reasoning, and one that I 
think applies to Professor Wickelgren’s essay, is that it is emphatically 
not an ideologically neutral move to presume that law can simply 
adopt the same epistemic conservatism as social science. Taking the 
risk of antitrust uncertainty from defendants does not mean that it no 
longer poses costs, and those costs are not just shifted to plaintiffs. 
 
 
 
 
13 Michael A. Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 
1265, 1346 (compiling evidence that actual balancing is rare); Michael A. Carrier, The Rule 
of Reason: An Empirical Update for the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 
(2009) (updating prior research and finding that actual balancing had become even less 
common). 
14 C. Scott Hemphill, Less Restrictive Alternatives in Antitrust Law, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 
927, 947 (2016). 
15 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Taking the Error Out of “Error Cost” Analysis: What’s 
Wrong with Antitrust’s Right, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 10, 12 (2015). 
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They are shifted to society. Moreover, whatever he may intend, the 
practical consequence of Professor Wickelgren’s position—at least as it 
seems to be stated here—will be that the government should do 
nothing or little because humans remain irremediably 
epistemologically frail. If (1) it is the case that a mere conjectural 
possibility of uncertainty is enough to trigger trial procedures that 
meaningfully impede enforcement, and (2) that there will always be 
conjecturally possible doubts in every case or most of them, by virtue 
of an epistemological frailty that is inalienably human, then a very 
significant policy judgment has been made without much 
consideration of the costs. In my opinion it would render antitrust 
largely inert.16 
Admittedly, I, too, want to use the edifice of contemporary price 
theory just as much as Professor Wickelgren does—all of it, as much as 
economists can produce, and, even better, all the empirical testing of 
it that can be done. Indeed, to some large degree it is what my book is 
all about. I defended Apple and the very traditional antitrust rule it 
applied using economic arguments, and one of the main counter-
arguments I challenged was the leftward view that the case should 
have been handled on much simpler terms. Consistent with the 
arguments of a popular movement in antitrust getting a lot of 
attention right now, many said that Apple should be resolved on the 
simple grounds that Amazon was very big, and therefore that it was 
the antitrust problem. That would reflect that movement’s return to 
“structuralism” or the like, which is not so far all that clearly 
elaborated, but appears to mean breaking up big firms and deciding 
who is the bad guy in a given case by asking which one looks biggest.17 
I tend to agree with Professor Hovenkamp that just tallying up social 
problems and assigning them to an anti-bigness policy is “worse than 
useless,”18 and one reason I think so is that this group got the Apple 
case itself so wrong. They saw that Amazon was big on various 
measures, had behaved very aggressively, and compared it to the more 
sympathetic figures of publishing houses and the authors they 
represent. On that basis they decided that the only right policy was to 
sue Amazon or do nothing at all. For reasons I spent about 500 pages 
 
 
 
 
16 See generally, id.; Alan Devlin & Michael Jacobs, Antitrust Error, 52 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 75 (2010). 
17 See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 718 (2017). 
18 Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 109 & n.214 (2018). 
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explaining, it is contemporary price theory that shows why they were 
mistaken. In some important sense, that was an argument for rules 
based on complexity—rules formulated on the basis of economic 
analysis—rather than simplicity—those that more or less ask who 
looks like the bad guy. The rule actually applied by the courts in the 
Apple case happens to be one that radically simplifies what happens in 
the courtroom. But it has been formulated and defended by using the 
full apparatus of contemporary price theory over a long time.  
But to be clear, there is a key difference between how I would 
deploy all that theoretical prowess and how Professor Wickelgren 
would. He seems to want the full weight of economic theory to be 
applied in each case to its particular facts, pretty much most of the 
time. The exceptions would be apparently only hard-core cartel 
restraints and the horizontal conspiracy cases now treated under the 
“quick look.”19 Only in those cases would factual possibilities be taken 
off the table as too implausible to waste the world’s time. I think that 
is a bad idea, for reasons I will explain. By contrast, I want to use 
economic theory and empirical evidence to fashion rules, to whatever 
extent possible, before litigation. I favor common-law antitrust rules 
made by judges over time with the input of our system’s large 
economic and legal commentariat. In the case of United States v. X, I 
would urge that to whatever extent possible, the court should be 
permitted only to ask whether some set of objective facts of the 
market’s nature and X’s conduct imply harm at odds with antitrust 
law, as determined through academic debate before litigation. 
I humbly do not believe much is added by the cases that Professor 
Wickelgren discusses to show that “robust” net-benefits 
measurements are desirable. He points to NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of 
the Univ. of Oklahoma20 as proof that despite their cost and difficulty, 
rule-of-reason cases “can be viable.”21 But the Court there took one of 
the best-known short-cuts in contemporary antitrust, and stressed at 
length that courts should use their judgment in appropriate cases 
radically to circumvent all the case-specific factual inquiry that 
Professor Wickelgren says is the only way to handle most antitrust 
cases. Likewise, he takes the Justice Department’s famous and ill-
 
 
 
 
19 Abraham L. Wickelgren, Determining the Optimal Antitrust Standard: How to Think 
About Per Se versus Rule of Reason, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 52, 54 (2012). 
20 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
21 Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 360. 
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fated monopolization suit against American Airlines22 as proof that 
simple antitrust rules are bad. His point here is a little unclear to me, 
and I hope I’m not unfairly missing something, but that case strikes 
me as showing the outright failure of “robust” analysis. It is quite true 
that the doctrinal predation standard applied there, first adopted by 
the Supreme Court in the 1990s,23 is a “simple” rule in the sense that it 
states a nominally bright-line rule for illegality. But making the factual 
demonstration needed to meet the elements of that bright-line test is 
an intensely factual, uncertain inquiry flawed by all the sins of full-
blown net-benefits balancing. The plaintiff and defendant must put on 
the testimony of competing expert witnesses who have to sort through 
not just a large volume of evidence, but conceptually difficult 
uncertainties about which costs are variable and which are not, which 
are properly allocable to the goods in question, and so on and so on. 
And, sure enough, the cost and difficulty of making this showing has 
essentially killed price predation as a viable theory of antitrust 
liability. It is now a common-place that price predation plaintiffs 
essentially never win, but what is less well-known is that they just 
never bring the cases at all.24 If price predation can sometimes be 
anticompetitive, as Professor Wickelgren apparently believes,25 then a 
doctrinal procedure making it so hard to prove that no one is willing 
to challenge it anymore is not a very desirable approach. 
But anyway, again, I think Professor Wickelgren and I may not 
actually be so far apart as all that makes it sound. As is often the case 
in discussing antitrust standards, I think we may just misunderstand 
each other. In a different paper, Professor Wickelgren once wrote this: 
 
 
 
 
 
22 Id. at 358 (discussing United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003)).  
23 See, Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
24 In the course of countering this very common claim, Professor Crane once pointed out 
that one plaintiff did in fact win a jury verdict after Brooke Group, that three others 
procured settlements, and that overall at least 57 complaints alleged predation. Daniel A. 
Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 & n.12, 15-16 (2005). 
(He actually omits one other significant success, presumably because summary judgment 
for the defendant was not reversed until just after his article had gone to print. See Spirit 
Airlines, Inc. v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005)). However, between Brooke 
Group in 1993 and Professor Crane’s article in 2005, there were something on the order of 
10,000 antitrust filings. So it appears that plaintiffs didn’t even bother to allege predation 
in more than about 0.6% of all antitrust cases, and they achieved even limited success in no 
more than about 0.05% of them.  
25 Wickelgren, supra note 19, at 53. 
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One way to express the justification for the per se rule 
is that the probability that… evidence will exist [that 
could overcome the presumption of 
anticompetitiveness in a particular case] is so small 
that it is not worth examining it. In that light, one can 
also view the structured rule of reason approach as one 
that should (although, in practice may not) reflect a 
similar paradigm in less extreme cases: we require 
stronger evidence of anticompetitive effects for conduct 
that we think are less likely to be anticompetitive and 
are more receptive to procompetitive effects arguments 
in such cases.26 
 
If I understand correctly, and he sees this as an acceptable way to 
make antitrust rules, then I think the space between us actually gets 
pretty small. All I really want is to use economic theory and empirical 
evidence to measure those same probabilities and formulate those 
judgments into rules. In my judgment, the theory and evidence 
unsurprisingly support a fairly strong preference for goods to be 
produced by comparatively numerous autonomous units vying non-
cooperatively for the same customers on the basis of quality-adjusted 
price. That is, the evidence pretty strongly favors price competition 
most of the time, and so we just don’t have to be that solicitous of 
arguments for avoiding it. 
In practical effect, the only change I envision from current law 
would be no more radical than shifting the burden of antitrust 
uncertainty back to where it had been for a long time—on defendants. 
That does not mean adopting per se rules or prohibiting defendants 
from defending themselves. It means measuring the probability that 
pro-competitive values can exist in academic debate, before litigation, 
to make rules by which the courts remove the ultimate decision from 
the realm of capricious fact-finders attempting to choose between 
extremely complex reports prepared by experts paid to serve the 
parties’ interests. 
Finally, this all begs what seems to me an important and virtually 
never-asked question. Why is it that we put so much more effort into 
this kind of argument in antitrust than in most other areas of law? 
Other areas of law, including tort-like, law enforcement rules 
resembling antitrust, also pose significant risks of interfering with 
what may be socially desirable business conduct. Is compliance with 
 
 
 
 
26 Id. at 53. 
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antitrust rules really so much more costly than compliance with, say, 
the law of fraud or bribery? Or, for that matter, real estate 
conveyancing? In those areas we tend not to see massive literatures of 
scholastically metaphysical navel-gazing to measure whether the 
precise tuning of its rules could be net allocationally inefficient. I don’t 
really know the explanation, though I have some guesses. For one 
thing, while I don’t think this is true at all of Professor Wickelgren, for 
some agonistes it’s really just politics. They tend to renounce the very 
suggestion pretty bitterly, but occasionally we see the 
acknowledgment of a genuine insider that conservative antitrust has 
had less interest in social-scientific truth for its own sake than in 
undermining the legitimacy of big government.27 But for those many 
whom this does not capture, like, I imagine, Professor Wickelgren, I 
think there is a different explanation. We consider social-scientific 
standards of empirical skepticism appropriate to antitrust law because 
there happens to be an entire profession devoted to it. There is an 
entire academic and professional institution devoted to industrial 
organization economics, and its professional mores are rather 
imperial in their designs on the rest of the world. 
In the end, the reason I think this is all about bacon (that is, the 
preference for empirical investigation over a priori speculation, 
associated with Francis Bacon) is not that I think the state of 
econometrics or the evidence existing on any particular question 
makes anything simple. Rather, the disagreement between Professor 
Wickelgren and I goes to how much significance we would put on the 
fact that humans can always come up with a priori arguments to 
argue anything. It is the degree to which we would let the conceptual 
possibility of pro-competitive explanations upend the application of 
manageable rules. I think the mere possibility of uncertainty is 
omnipresent, because it is irremediable in human nature. But I don’t 
think that the cost of uncertainty is always substantial or that it always 
outweighs the cost of government quietude. 
Ultimately, I believe the question is not whether we should 
entertain complexity. Of course we should. The question is at what 
point in the policy process we should give it the time of day. 
 
(2) That Other Thing, That Was Really Good: Antitrust as a 
Theory of the Firm. In the course of making the argument above, 
 
 
 
 
27 See, e.g., George L. Priest, The Limits of Antitrust and the Chicago School Tradition, 6 J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 1, 9 (2010). 
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Professor Wickelgren makes one specific point that I think is very 
good and perceptive, and captures something I must address more 
clearly in the book. It seems to me to go to the heart of the theoretical 
contribution I hope to make. That he misunderstood me is my fault, 
and it shows that I need more careful explanation.  
In his extended defense of the economic literature on RPM, 
Professor Wickelgren points out that it can be seen as just an 
extension of a set of institutions we consider so legitimate that we 
scarcely think about them. Firms exist, and they make their internal 
decisions by fiat rather than exchange. Even if we did not take their 
existence as a pre-conscious given—as most of us do most of the 
time—an ingenious little theoretical literature happens to explain 
them nicely. Assuming that markets do in fact optimize values in the 
way that theory predicts, then wherever market exchanges are 
costless, every decision made by every person would be made by 
bilateral exchange between individuals. There would be no firms, 
because hierarchical decisions within them could not improve on 
market outcomes, and the costs of making them would therefore be 
wasteful.28 Professor Wickelgren objects to my characterization of the 
RPM literature as “anti-market” (his words) because in fact everyone 
agrees that there should be firms, because exchanges are in fact costly, 
and sometimes more so than decision by internal fiat. And indeed the 
transaction-cost literature has for a long time argued that vertical 
integrations of various kinds—including by vertical contract—might be 
desirable transaction-cost accommodations. 
To some degree, I think Professor Wickelgren’s points here reflect 
a real and pretty uncharitable misunderstanding, though the blame is 
mine for not explaining myself better and I hereby resolve to do so in 
the final product. With respect I don’t believe I have a “very extreme 
view of the role of markets,” and my position doesn’t require some 
insane, atomistic rejection of all long-term contracting (as my 
discussion of the Addyston Pipe29 case might have made clear, but 
since it didn’t I will expand it to make it more clear). I don’t consider it 
 
 
 
 
28 The point was observed originally in Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386 (1937). It has been developed in various ways by many others, but 
best known and most influential has been the “transaction cost” economics associated 
chiefly associated with Oliver Williamson. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND 
HIERARCHIES (1975). 
29 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 
175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
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important to prove that anyone is theologically “anti-market” or not.30 
Separately, I never say and I don’t believe that theoretical defense of 
RPM requires that consumers are “irrational.”31 In misunderstanding 
me on those points, Professor Wickelgren misunderstands my more 
important point about the RPM literature. I take its history as an 
example in which mere theoretical possibilities persuaded a lot of 
people to suspend the usually strong presumption of economic theory 
that competitors, including resellers of a thing, should compete with 
each other on price. That example seemed important to me in part 
because it involves the very mechanism at the heart of my theoretical 
argument, and usefully shows it to be the same (in that respect) as 
other defenses of private conduct that we don’t usually think of as 
related.  
Specifically, many defenses of RPM argue that intra-brand 
competition keeps resellers from providing costly services, like in-
store demonstrations, well-trained sales staff, or brand-specific repair 
facilities. But it is necessarily the case that if providing these services 
is net socially desirable, then they will be provided in ordinary 
competition unless something is wrong with the particular market in 
question. The literature’s own most important progenitor himself 
recognized precisely this problem, and he said so in his most famous 
paper. He there devised the “free-riding” defense of RPM precisely 
because, in the absence of that externality, all retail services that 
would be efficient would be provided without it.32 
Professor Wickelgren says I mistook the RPM literature for an 
argument of consumer irrationality because I say in the book that “the 
claim was that consumers can’t be trusted to know what they want, 
and markets can’t be trusted to give it to them.” But by that I didn’t 
mean at all that RPM defenses assume consumer irrationality. Rather, 
they assume a flaw that can keep markets from giving consumers what 
 
 
 
 
30 Wickelgren, supra note 1, at 363. 
31 Id. at 362. 
32 See Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. L. & ECON. 86, 
89 (1960). A handful of other common justifications for RPM don’t require this kind of 
criticism of price competition, like the argument that new entrants may need to give 
retailers the promise of some margin, through protection from intra-brand price 
competition, just to secure any distribution at all. For what it may be worth, those 
arguments have their own problems. See generally Warren S. Grimes, The Path Forward 
After Leegin: Seeking Consensus Reform of the Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 75 
ANTITRUST L.J. 467, 482 (2008). 
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they want, and betray—I humbly believe—a credulous willingness to 
believe that such flaws are common and hard to address by any means 
except restraining price competition. I guess from context I assumed 
that would be apparent, but obviously I must clarify. Either way, 
though, again, it doesn’t really matter. My point was that, as in other 
circumstances in which I think our unspoken propensity to doubt 
price rivalry as an organizing tool, the history of the RPM literature 
shows how easily mere conceptual, a priori suggestions of uncertainty 
can throw our whole competition policy upside down. 
Admittedly, the RPM example also seemed delicious to me, 
because the defense of it has been the focus of such a massive 
academic endeavor that in retrospect is coming to seem (to me) 
ridiculous. Even its own most active voices have begun to 
acknowledge that much of it has been abused and in various ways was 
probably incorrect or oversold. 
In any case, though, Professor Wickelgren’s observation struck me 
as far-sighted and perspicuous, and it will be of use to me. Economics 
still mostly does without much of a theory of the firm, and antitrust 
basically has none at all.33 In fact, antitrust is routinely and casually 
ignorant of the many ways in which its rules imply some theory of the 
firm, but leave its implications completely unexplored. As just one 
routine example, it is rarely asked why “collusion” among separately 
organized firms is so different than the decisions that would be made 
by their board of directors if they all just merged. Exploring this 
problem and its consequences for antitrust will most definitely play a 
role either in my revisions in this book or in future work. 
B. On Amazon: Dude, Totally 
Professor Rub’s generous and thoughtful essay touches on quite a 
variety of specific points, which will be useful in my revisions,34 but it 
seems important only to respond to one major theme. His most 
 
 
 
 
33 See generally Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury 
and the Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the Firm, 18 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
377 (2011). 
34 I love, for example, his invocation of survey evidence showing how dismissive 
economists are of public opinion. Rub, supra note 1, at 376 & n 51. I found myself 
wondering why he didn’t take it a next step and make what could have been a nice little 
criticism of me and the antitrust politics I like—mea culpa!—as just reflecting what might 
be a knee-jerking and unfounded elitism.   
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important criticism seemed to be that understanding the popular 
reaction to United States v. Apple requires more consideration of how 
Amazon might pose legitimate threats, even if they are not actionable 
under American antitrust. Crucially, to me, he says that left-ward 
criticism of the case did not actually depend on public antipathy or 
misunderstanding of “competition” as such, but rather on ways that 
Amazon posed real threats as a “monopoly” in senses not really 
addressed by present law.35 That goes pretty directly to the heart of my 
claim that the public opposition to the case was opposition to 
competition itself. In the final book, I will respond to these points by 
clarifying three important things.  
First, I agree with Professor Rub emphatically that Amazon poses 
serious threats and is a proper concern of public policy. I think he 
mistook my explanation that Amazon would be difficult to sue—and 
especially my criticism of the Apple defendants’ price predation 
claims—as an argument that Amazon should be difficult to sue, and 
should not be constrained by antitrust. On the contrary, I think 
Amazon deserves serious scrutiny, both by its raw size within its 
various markets, and because of its record of conduct.  
Fortunately, I happen to think Amazon is probably perfectly 
subject to legal challenge now, under existing American law without 
the need for any serious modification. On the one hand, I don’t 
actually agree with some of Professor Rub’s characterizations of why 
Amazon is threatening, as he takes a few things factually for granted 
that could be quite significant. First, he believes that Amazon has 
“very significant market power.”36 It’s not exactly clear, but he appears 
to use this phrase in the way it is used in economics and antitrust: as 
the power to raise price.37 I tend to agree with him that Amazon likely 
has some pricing power, but with an important qualification. I don’t 
agree that Amazon could substantially raise its retail prices. Retail on 
 
 
 
 
35 Id. at 370 (saying critics of Apple opposed Amazon for being a “monopoly” rather than 
because they opposed “competition”; their views represented not an attack on competition, 
but rather an “attack on monopolies and the risk they pose to competition.”). 
36 Id. at 370 n.4. 
37 While Professor Rub doesn’t explain his own understanding of “market power,” he 
sometimes says explicitly that Amazon could raise retail prices if it wanted to. He says that 
Amazon “has enough market power to raise retail prices well beyond its marginal costs, but 
it refrains from doing it,” id. at 373; and that, for the time being, Amazon “transfers much 
of the fruits of its market power to its consumers.” Id. at 387. As a result, it “uses its power 
to extract excessive surplus” from suppliers in order to “transfer it to consumers.” Id. 
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the whole has remained mostly quite competitive, and Amazon has 
kept its dominance in large part by the unmatchable aggression of its 
pricing. Rather, Amazon seems already a genuinely dangerous, 
predatory monopsonist—a power buyer, as opposed to a power 
seller—whose publicly-known conduct already seems like it could 
make out a plausible case for the “exclusionary conduct” component 
of an action under § 2 of the Sherman Act.38 I doubt that anyone 
knows exactly why for sure, but securing distribution through Amazon 
is now plainly significant enough that suppliers submit to 
substantially oppressive demands and price pressures from Amazon. 
Those things may not violate antitrust law, but if the power to impose 
them was gotten through exclusionary means, then they do. In fact, I 
think Amazon is pretty well on its way to serious federal antitrust 
challenge that in many ways could resemble the famous United States 
v. Microsoft.39 I tend to think such a case is more likely than not 
within the next decade or so, barring a serious change to Amazon’s 
behavior or its fortunes. Though I would have thought any such 
suggestion completely absurd a year ago, I think that in light of recent 
events such a case is not that unlikely even during the Trump 
administration.40 
Second, Professor Rub stresses Americans’ concerns that even if 
some antitrust action were taken against Amazon, it wouldn’t actually 
address certain real social problems. He implies therefore that 
Americans don’t doubt competition as such, but antitrust. But I will 
 
 
 
 
38 Monopsony actions are unusual in American law, but monopsonization is perfectly well 
recognized as an actionable violation of § 2, and where the claims are brought they are 
doctrinally more or less indistinguishable from § 2 monopolization claims. See generally 
ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 
2010). 
39 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
40 Right now, everybody is trying to figure what is going on with the Trump 
administration’s antitrust program, and the honest answer is that no one outside the 
agencies can be very sure. For the moment, most attention is fixed on the Justice 
Department’s surprising, apparently brave, and seemingly substantively strong challenge 
to the merger of AT&T and Time Warner, Inc. Before that suit was filed, there were many 
highly varied, and mostly wrong, predictions of what would happen during the four years 
of the Trump administration. The predictions mostly tended to anticipate a very restrained, 
conservative, and hum-drum enforcement program. Now the question is whether the 
AT&T/Time Warner challenge is a one-off—as some think, suspecting that it reflected not a 
renewed enforcement vigor but the personal and political interests of President Trump—or 
rather that it bespeaks a new commitment to vigorous merger control. In any case, see 
generally Chris Sagers, #LOLNothingMatters, 63 ANTITRUST BULL. 7 (2018). 
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clarify that existing antitrust could actually address the specific 
problems he identifies, at least if it is applied a little more vigorously. 
For example, it is not somehow separately relevant, as distinct from 
the harms addressed in a § 2 monopsony case, that as Amazon grows 
in market power, the lower wholesale prices it negotiates will reduce 
authors’ revenues.41 That is in fact the whole point of having a public 
policy against monopsony, and it is the same whether or not the 
sellers happen to enjoy intellectual property rights. The harm is a loss 
of revenues to authors and other suppliers that leads to inefficient loss 
of supply and incentives to innovate. Accordingly, it would be better to 
favor antitrust control of both Apple and Amazon, instead of neither. 
Therefore, to me, the real policy question is not so much whether 
Amazon’s power should be controlled, but how. Vigorous antitrust 
toward Amazon right now would commend a few specific steps. Above 
all, the agencies would benefit from ongoing investigation of Amazon 
and the other major platforms, and it would be surprising if they have 
not already done a large amount of it. At least three things would seem 
quite important for them to surveil. Above all, they should be working 
to understand if and how Amazon has acquired power as a 
monopsony buyer. That could mean, among other things, 
understanding why online distribution over Amazon came to be so 
critical to so many suppliers, and also understanding the many 
documented means by which Amazon has disadvantaged its 
competitors, suppliers, and even the firms that sell things on its own 
“Amazon marketplace.”42 It could also mean bigger-picture theoretical 
work to understand how Amazon’s raw size or the nature of its 
business—for example, a network or scope-economy advantage of 
being almost literally “the everything store”—somehow give it power 
 
 
 
 
41 See Rub, supra note 1, at 387. It is not correct, incidentally, that where one firm controls 
a vital point in distribution then “that market” in which it is dominant “does not really 
exist.” Id. at 385. It exists perfectly well. The market’s existence manifests in the fact that 
the monopolist cannot just set any price it wants. Instead, just like every participant in 
every market, it sets price so that marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The operation of 
even that monopolized market would cause any other price to be less profitable to the 
monopolist. See CHRIS SAGERS, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: ANTITRUST § 2.3.3 (2d ed. 
2014). 
42 See, e.g., OLIVIA LAVECCHIA & STACY MITCHELL, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, 
AMAZON’S STRANGLEHOLD: HOW THE COMPANY’S TIGHTENING GRIP IS STIFLING 
COMPETITION, ERODING JOBS, AND THREATENING COMMUNITIES (2016), 
https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/ILSR_AmazonReport_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6CP-3HVQ] (cataloguing many specific instances). 
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over suppliers, and whether anything about it might be illegal. Second, 
they should have a careful ongoing concern for Amazon’s unilateral 
vertical relationships, and whether it is using them to shore up power, 
either as a buyer or a seller. It seems that now that Amazon’s market 
shares are very large, its ability to start shoring up exclusivities either 
forward or backward seem threatening. Finally, regulators should 
consider the longer-term, dynamic machinations that may be at play 
in Amazon’s long history of acquisitions, many of which in retrospect 
look like fairly exclusionary plans to dominate existing or new sectors. 
Professor Rub tells the well-known story of Amazon’s acquisition of 
Diapers.com, but that is only one among many. 
As a third and final clarification, I definitely agree with an ultimate 
conclusion he suggests, and I did not mean to imply otherwise. In the 
end, capitalism poses some problems that have no very good solution, 
and certainly it does not solve them just to have more competition. We 
will have to live with that even if there are not really any plausible 
alternatives to it as a basic system. In one respect, however, it seems 
like we very plausibly could and should solve some of those problems 
just by making use of some policies other than competition. And so, 
we plainly do need a social welfare policy to mitigate capitalism’s 
harsh side-effects—particularly the problem of those who are the 
losers during times of technological or other transition. That seems 
like something we could manage with progressive taxation and social 
welfare programs. As a matter of fact, we need such policies for two 
separate reasons. First, it is plain that microeconomic price 
competition leaves unaddressed certain problems that are incumbent 
to address, like inequality of wealth and the distribution of losses 
following change. It is incumbent both morally and because 
preserving wealth equity seems likely to have macroeconomic 
benefits.  
But a wholly separate reason to address those harms is to preserve 
the political viability of antitrust itself. If it is true, as Arnold said, that 
antitrust enforcement depends on the public attitude, then a serious 
threat to its legitimacy would be the public perception that it causes 
ills like these. To borrow from Arthur Schlessinger, "[t]hose who 
would now have government abandon social responsibility in the 
name of unbridled individualism are doing Marx's work for him . . . 
."43 
 
 
 
 
43 ARTHUR M. SCHLESSINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 244 (1986). 
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This all goes to something important I tried to explain toward the 
end of the book. It obviously is true that competition generates some 
harms that seem necessary to remedy, and that competition itself 
cannot solve. But it does not follow at all that limiting competition is 
the right solution. Competition does well what it does in its own 
sphere, but it needs the support of other policies too. 
III. THE COMMON THREAD 
In the end, I think both these essays really were about one thing, 
and I need to clarify that the book itself was actually about another 
thing entirely. On some level, all three of us agree with the premise 
that there is a problem in America, at this contemporary moment, and 
the job is to figure out the policy to fix it. But Professors Wickelgren 
and Rub both take the problem to be that Amazon is big and its 
suppliers have conspired. They say I should reconsider the doctrinal 
antitrust specifics to tinker out a correction. 
I say in fact that the problem of interest is actually much deeper 
and inherent in the having of a competition policy at all, and it is 
fundamentally a political or sociological problem. Having such a 
policy, at least on the tort-style law enforcement model that has 
existed in America and most other countries with antitrust laws, 
means having markets and letting them work. (Even on much more 
aggressive plans that is true; on a no-fault monopoly or affirmative 
deconcentration plan, for example, the goal at some point is just to let 
markets do the regulating.) But we forget much too easily that 
markets in their ordinary operation are machines for producing pain. 
And we have repeatedly, throughout the history of antitrust, 
misconstrued that pain for defects in markets themselves requiring 
either internal self-regulation or government intervention to protect 
firms from competition. So the problem in this problem-book is not 
that firms conspired or that Amazon is big. It is that antitrust itself 
seems not to work well under many circumstances for the simple 
reason that, whether they know it or not, the people don’t believe in it. 
 
 
 
